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Abstract. The last years have seen a number of proposals to incorpo-
rate Security Engineering into mainstream Software Requirements Engi-
neering. However, capturing trust and security requirements at an orga-
nizational level (as opposed to a design level) is still an open problem.
This paper presents a formal framework for modeling and analyzing se-
curity and trust requirements. It extends the Tropos methodology, an
agent-oriented software engineering methodology. The key intuition is
that in modeling security and trust, we need to distinguish between the
actors that manipulate resources, accomplish goals or execute tasks, and
actors that own the resources or the goals. To analyze an organization
and its information systems, we proceed in two steps. First, we built a
trust model, determining the trust relationships among actors, and then
we give a functional model, where we analyze the actual delegations
against the trust model, checking whether an actor that oﬀers a service
is authorized to have it.
The formal framework allows for the automatic veriﬁcation of security
and trust requirements by using a suitable delegation logic that can be
mechanized within Datalog. To make the discussion more concrete, we
illustrate the proposal with a Health Care case study.
keywords : Requirements Engineering for Security and Trust, Agent-
Oriented Technologies, Security Engineering, Trust Models for Modeling
Business and Organizations
1 Introduction
Trust Management is one of the main challenges in the development of dis-
tributed open information systems (IS). Not surprisingly, Security Engineering
? This work has been partially funded by the IST programme of the EU Commission,
FET under the IST-2001-37004 WASP project and by the FIRB programme of MIUR
under the RBNE0195K5 ASTRO Project. We would like to thank the anonymous
reviewers for useful comments.has received substantial attention in the last years [3,7,10]. Looking at tradi-
tional approaches to software requirements engineering, we ﬁnd that security is
treated as a non-functional requirement [6] which introduces quality constraints
under which the system must operate [24,26]. Software designers have recog-
nized the need to integrate most non-functional requirements (such as reliability
and performance) into the software development processes [8], but security still
remains an afterthought. Worse still, trust is often left entirely outside the pic-
ture.
This often means that security mechanisms have to be ﬁtted into a pre-
existing design which may not be able to accommodate them due to potential
conﬂicts with functional requirements or usability. Moreover, the implementation
of the software system may assume trust relationships among users or between
users and the system that are simply not there. Alternatively, the implementation
may introduce protection mechanisms that just hinder operation in a trusted
domain that was not perceived as a trusted domain by the software engineer.
In a nutshell, current methodologies for IS development do not resolve security-
and trust-related concerns early on [25].
This has spurred a number of researchers to model security and trust re-
quirements into “standard” software engineering methodologies. J¨ urjens pro-
poses UMLsec [16], an extension of the Uniﬁed Modelling Language (UML),
for modeling security related features, such as conﬁdentiality and access con-
trol. Lodderstedt et al. present a modeling language, based on UML, called
SecureUML [21]. Their approach is focused on modeling access control policies
and how these (policies) can be integrated into a model-driven software devel-
opment process. McDermott and Fox adapt use cases [22] to analyze security
requirements, by introducing the abuse case model: a speciﬁcation of complete
interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the result of the
interaction is harmful to the system, one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders
of the system. Guttorm and Opdahl [15] model security by deﬁning the concept
of a misuse case as the inverse of a use case, which describes a function that the
system should not allow.
One of the major limitations of all these proposals is that they treat security
and trust in system-oriented terms, and do not support the modeling and anal-
ysis of trust and trust relationships at an organizational level. In other words,
they are targeted to model a computer system and the policies and access con-
trol mechanisms it supports. In contrast, to understand the problem of trust
management and security engineering we need to model the organization and
the relationships between all involved actors, the system being just one possible
actor. For instance, J¨ urjens introduce cryptographic functions which represent
a particular implementation of some trust-protection mechanism at the digital
level. However, an analysis of operational Health Care systems suggests that
(for better or worse) most medical data are still only available in paper form. In
such a setting, cryptographic mechanisms are largely irrelevant, whereas physicallocks are very useful in avoiding untrusted access to sensitive medical data3. Yet,
once we focus on the digital solution, we end up having little room to specify
physical protection requirements at the organizational (as opposed to IS) level.
Thus, we need to focus on requirement engineering methodologies that al-
low for modeling organizations and actors, and enhance these with notions of
trust and trust relationships. To this extent, Tropos - an agent-based software
engineering methodology [4,5] are particularly well suited. For example, in [19,
20] Liu et al. have shown how to use Tropos to model privacy and security con-
cerns of an organization. However, in [13] the authors have shown that Tropos
lacks the ability to capture at the same time the functional and security features
of the organization. In [23] a structured process integrate security and system
engineering has been proposed. However, a formal framework for modeling and
analyzing security requirements within Tropos is still missing.
In this paper we introduce a process that integrates trust, security and system
engineering, using the same concepts and notations used during “traditional” re-
quirements speciﬁcation. Building upon [23], we propose a solution that is based
on augmenting the i*/Tropos framework to take trust into account. The key
intuition is to distinguish and make explicit the notion of oﬀering a service and
owning a service4 and the notions of functional dependency and trust depen-
dency. A functional dependency can lead to the delegation of tasks, whereas a
trust dependency can lead to the delegation of permissions.
Next (§2) we provide an brief description of the Tropos methodology and
introduce a simple Health Care information system that will be used as case
study throughout the paper. Then we describe the basic concepts and diagrams
that we use for modeling trust (§3), followed by their formalization (§4), and
implementation, along with some experimental results (§5). Finally, we conclude
the paper with some directions for future work (§6).
2 Case Study
This section presents a simple health care IS to illustrate our approach. Secu-
rity and trust are key issues for health care information systems, with privacy,
integrity and availability of health information being the major security con-
cerns [2].
The Tropos methodology [4,5] strives to model both the organizational en-
vironment of a system and the system itself. It uses the concepts of actor, goal,
3 For example, the ﬁle of a patient waiting for a kidney transplant in a high-proﬁle
nephrology center contains many paper documents that are copies of reports from
surgeons or clinicians from the referring hospitals of the patient. These documents
are by far more sensitive than the patient’s date and place of birth or waiting list
registration number in the medical information system.
4 Here it is an example derived from EU privacy legislation: a citizen’s personal data
is processed by an information system (which oﬀer a data access service) but it is
owned by the citizen himself whose consent is necessary for the service to be delivered
to 3rd parties.task, resource and social dependency for deﬁning obligations of actors (depen-
dees) to other actors (dependers). Actors have strategic goals within the system
or the organization and represent (social) agents (organizational, human or soft-
ware), roles etc. A goal represents some strategic interest of an actor. A task
represents a way of doing something (in particular, a task can be executed to
satisfy a goal). A resource represents a physical or an informational entity. In the
rest of the paper, we say service for goal, task, or resource. Finally, a dependency
between two actors indicates that one actor depends on another to accomplish
a goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource.
We start the Health Care example by considering the following actors:
– Patient, that depends on the hospital for receiving appropriate health care;
– Hospital, that provides medical treatment and depends on the patients for
having their personal information.
– Clinician, physician of the hospital that provides medical health advice and,
whenever needed, provide accurate medical treatment;
– Health Care Authority (HCA) that control and guarantee the fair resources
allocation and a good quality of the delivered services.
Figure 1 shows the dependency model among these actors. Actors are rep-
resented as circles; dependums - goals, tasks and resources - are respectively
represented as ovals, hexagons and rectangles; and dependencies have the form
depender → dependum → dependee. The Patient depends on the Hospital for
receiving medical treatments, and in turn, the Hospital depends on the Clin-
ician for providing such treatments. Clinician depends on Patients for their
personal information and on the Hospital for speciﬁc professional consultancies
and for patient personal information. The Hospital depends on other Clinicians
for providing professional consultancies and on HCA for checking equity resource
distribution. Finally, HCA depends on Patient for personal information.
Finally we introduce the Medical Information System as another actor who,
according the current privacy legislation, can share patient medical data if and
only if consent is obtained from the patient in question. The Medical Information
System manages patients information, including information about the medical
treatments they have received. Figure 2 shows the ﬁnal dependency model.
3 Security-Aware Tropos
The Tropos models so far say nothing about security requirements. Loosely
speaking, the dependee is a server and the depender is a client. There is an
implicit trust and delegation relationship between the two. In our extended mod-
eling framework, we identify four relationships:
trust (among two agents and a service), so that A trust B on a certain goal G;
delegation (among two agents and a service), whenever A explicitly delegates
to B a goal, or the permission to execute a task or access a resource;
oﬀer (between an agent and a service), so that A can oﬀer to other agents the
possibility of fulﬁlling a goal, executing a task or delivering a resource;Authority
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Fig.1. The ﬁrst Health Care System dependency model (without the Medical Infor-
mation System actor)
ownership (between an agent and a service), whenever an agent is the legite-
mate owner of a goal, task or resource.
Note the diﬀerence between owning a service and oﬀering a service. For exam-
ple, a patient is the legitemate owner of his personal data. However the data may
be stored on a Medical Information System that oﬀers access to the data. This
distinction explains clearly why IS managers need the consent of the patient for
data processing. Also note the diﬀerence between trust and delegation. Delega-
tion marks a formal passage in the requirements modeling: a TM certiﬁcate will
have to be eventually issued for the delegatee when implementing the system.
Such certiﬁcate needs not to be digital, but it marks presence of a transaction.
In contrast, trust marks simply a social relationship that is not formalized by a
“contract” (such as digital credential). There might be cases (e.g. because it is
impractical or too costly), where we might be happy with a “social” protection,
and other cases in which security is essential. Such decision must be taken by
the designer and the formal model just oﬀers support to spot inconsistencies.
The basic eﬀect of delegation is augmenting the number of permission holders.
Intuitively, we have split the trust and delegation aspects of the dependency
relation. Moreover, we do not assume that a delegation implies a trust. Using
this extension of the modeling framework, we can now reﬁne the methodology:
1. design a trust model among the actors of the systems;
2. identify who owns goals, tasks, or resources and who is able to fulﬁll goals,
execute tasks or deliver resources;
3. deﬁne functional dependencies and delegations of goals among agents build-
ing a functional model.
The basic idea is that the owner of an object has full authority concerning
access and disposition of his object, and he can also delegate it to other actors.Medical
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Fig.2. The ﬁnal Health Care System dependency model (with the Medical Information
System actor)
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Fig.3. Patient-Hospital Basic Dependencies
We represent this relationship as an edge labelled by O. We use trust (T) to
model the basic trust relationship between agents and permission (P) to model
the actual transfer of rights in some form (e.g. a digital certiﬁcate, a signed paper,
etc.), and D for a Tropos dependency. There are other relations in Tropos, but
we do not use them here.
The new constructs and the methodology make it possible to analyze the
trust relationship between actors and the consequent integrated security and
functional requirements. Figure 3-a and Figure 3-b show, respectively, the trust
model and the functional model with just Patient and Hospital, as a ﬁrst mod-
eling attempt. Here, the Hospital owns medical treatments, the Patient owns
his own personal information and trusts the Hospital for his personal data. In
the functional model, Patient depends on Hospital for medical treatments. Since
Hospital needs personal information to provide accurate medical treatment, Pa-
tient permits the use of his personal information to Hospital.
We reﬁne the system building the trust model (Figure 4) corresponding to the
original Tropos model of Figure 1. Clinician owns medical treatments. PatientAuthority
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Fig.4. Health Care System-2 trust model
trusts HCA and Clinician for his personal information, and HCA trusts Hospital
for it. Further, Hospital trusts HCA for checking equity resource distribution.
Clinician trusts Hospital for medical treatment and for requesting speciﬁc pro-
fessional consulting, and Hospital trusts Clinician for providing such consulting
and for patient personal information. Notice at top of Figure 4 that there is a
trust relationship between two actors (HCA and Hospital) on a resource that is
owned by neither of them.
The next step is to add the Medical Information System and its relation-
ship with other actors. Figure 5 and Figure 6 corresponding to the dependencies
model in Figure 2, show respectively the trust model and the functional model.
In the trust model we consider the trust relationship between Hospital and Med-
ical System Information for patient personal information, and in the functional
model the dependency between Clinician and Medical Information System to
access patient record and to update patient record.
An interesting feature of Tropos is the reﬁnement analysis and the usage of
rationale diagrams that explain relationships among actors. Speciﬁcally, the goal
of accessing a patient record introduced in Figure 2, can be and-decomposed in
three subgoals: request patient personal data, check authorization and send med-
ical information. To save on space, we merge the trust model and the functional
model for the rationale diagram in Figure 7. We can see that after Medical In-
formation System requests patient personal information to Clinician, it requests
also an authorization to send patient medical information to Clinician. It can
get it directly by the Patient or by the Clinician through delegation.
4 Formalization
In the “trust-management” approach to distributed authorization, a “requester”
submits a request, possibly supported by a set of “credentials” issued by otherMedical
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Fig.6. Health Care System-3 functional model
parties, to an “authorizer”, who controls the requested resources. To this end,
we consider some features of delegation logics to model security requirements.
Particularly, we follow Li et al [18] that provides a logical framework for rep-
resenting security policies and credentials for authorization in large-scale, open,
distributed systems. To simplify authorization in a decentralized environment,
Li, Grosof and Feigenbaum use a system where access-control decisions are based
on authenticated attributes of the subjects, and attribute authority is decentral-
ized. They then develop a logic-based language, called Delegation Logic (DL)
[17], to represent policies, credentials, and requests in distributed authorization
that satisfy the above requirements. Note that they use the term authorization
to denote the process of “authentication + access control”.O
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Formal Tropos Secure Tropos
fulﬁlled(Service : s) owns(Actor : a,Service : s)
has(Actor : a,Service : s)
oﬀers(Actor : a,Service : s)
fulﬁlls(Actor : a,Service : s)
Table 1. Properties for the single agent
At ﬁrst we introduce the predicates used for modeling properties of an actor
(Table 1) and relationships between actors (Table 2). In deﬁning these predicates,
we don’t distinguish between goals, tasks and resources, and treat them all as
services, instead. Thus, we say “fulﬁll a service” for “accomplish a goal”, “execute
a task”, or “deliver a resource”. The intuition behind predicate owns is that
owns(a,s) holds if the agent a owns the service s. The owner of a service has
full authority concerning access and disposition of his service, and he can also
delegate this authority to other actors. The basic idea of has is that when
someone has a service, he has authority concerning access and disposition of
the service, and he can also delegate this authority to other actors if the owner
of the service agrees. When an actor has the capabilities to fulﬁll a service, he
oﬀers it. This means that oﬀers(a,s) holds if a oﬀers s. We assume that a can
oﬀer the service if he has it. The predicates fulﬁlled and fulﬁlls are true when
the service are fulﬁlled by an actor. Particularly, predicate fulﬁlls(a,s) holds if
actor a fulﬁlls the service s, and predicate fulﬁlled(s) holds if s has been fulﬁlled.
Formal Tropos already includes the predicate fulﬁlled [12].Formal Tropos
depends(Actor : a,Service : s,Actor : b)
Secure Tropos
trustBL
 
Actor : a,Service : s,Actor : b,N
+ ∪ {∗} : n,ActorSet : B

delegBL
 
id : idC,Actor : a,Service : s,Actor : b,N
+ ∪ {∗} : n,ActorSet : B

Table 2. Relationship between actors
Example 1. The patient owns his data and he has full authority concerning its
access and disposition. In particular, the owner of the service has the service. In
our framework we model these notions, respectively, as owns(patient1,record1)
and has(patient1,record1).
Example 2. Once the Health Care Authority has the patient records and the
hospital gives it the goal to check behavior of patients and of the doctors, the
HCA oﬀers the goal and then fulﬁlls it. Following we show as we model this in
Secure Tropos oﬀers(hca,check) and fulﬁlls(hca,check).
As for trust, we present predicate trustBL: trustBL(a,s,b,n,B) holds is actor
a trusts actor b for service s; n is called the trust depth (“*” means unlimited
depth); and B is called black list. As suggest by Li et al. [17] for their delegation
logics, trust has depth, which is either a positive integer or “*” (“*” means
unlimited depth). One way to view trust depth is the number of re-delegation
of permission steps that are allowed, where depth 1 means that no re-delegation
of permission is allowed, depth 2 means that one further step is allowed, depth
3 means that two further steps are allowed, and depth * means that unlimited
re-delegation of permission is allowed. The black list is the set that the actor
a distrusts at least for what concerns this permission. delegBL(idC,a,s,b,n,B)
holds is actor a delegates the service s to actor b. The actor a is called the
delegater; the actor b is called the delegatee; idC is the certiﬁcate identiﬁer; n
is the delegation depth; and B is called black list. The latter represents the set
of actors that the delegater doesn’t want to have the object. The idea behind
black-lists in trust and delegation is modeling exceptions along the chain of trust.
For example, a patient may want to delegate the permission to read his personal
data to his general practitioner and to all agents trusted by him (delegation
with depth 1). However, he may want to restrict such blank transfer of rights
to avoid that the information goes to somebody he distrusts (e.g. his previous
general practitioner). A delegation has depth, as for trust. We can also deﬁne
an abbreviation for a delegation chain as
delegBLChain(a,o,b) ≡
(
∃k s.t. ∃a1 ...ak ∃n1 ...nk−1 ∃B1 ...Bk−1
∀i ∈ [1...k − 1] delegBL(idi,ai,o,ai+1,ni,Bi) ∧
a1 = a ∧ ak = b
Example 3. Patient trusts Clinician on his medical data.
trustBL(patient1,record1,clinician1,1,∅)Trust model
Ax1: has(A,S) ← owns(A,S)
Ax2: trustBL(A,S,B,N − 1,B) ← trustBL(A,S,B,N,B) ∧ N > 2
Ax3: trustBL(A,S,C,P,B1 ∪ B2) ← trustBL(A,S,B,N,B1)∧
trustBL(B,S,C,M,B2)∧
N > 2 ∧ P = min{N − 1,M}
Functional model
Ax4: has(B,S) ← delegBL(ID,A,S,B,N,B)
Ax5: fulﬁlled(S) ← fulﬁlls(A,S)
Ax6: fulﬁlls(A,S) ← has(A,S) ∧ oﬀers(A,S)
Table 3. Axioms for trust model and functional model
When the Clinician visits his patient he requests to the Medical Information
System the patient record. The Medical Information System delegates patient
record to the patient’s clinician. The clinician cannot delegate the record to
others actors. Formally this is delegBL(m1,medicalIS,record1,clinician1,1,∅).
In Table 3 we present the axiom for the trust model and for the functional
model. As mentioned earlier, the owner of a service has full authority concerning
access and disposition of it. Thus, Ax1 states that if an actor owns a service,
he has it. Ax2 states that if someone trusts with depth N, then he also trusts
with smaller depth. Ax3 describes the trust relationship, i.e, it completes the
trust relationship between actors. Ax4 says that a delegatee has the service he
was delegated. Ax5 states that an actor fulﬁlls a service, then the service is
(eventually) fulﬁlled. Ax6 states that if an actor has a service and oﬀers it, then
he (eventually) fulﬁlls it.
Properties are diﬀerent from axioms: they are constraints that must be
checked. It is up to designer to choose which properties his own design should
respect. If the set of constraints is not consistent, i.e. they cannot all be simulta-
neously satisﬁed, the system is inconsistent, and hence it is not secure. In Table 4
we use the A ⇒? B to mean that one must check that each time A holds, it is
desirable that B also holds. Pr1 and Pr2 state that if an agent oﬀers or delegates,
he should have the object. Pr3 says that to fulﬁll a goal an actor must be able
to use and oﬀer it. Pr4, Pr5 and Pr6 state that if an actor has, oﬀers, or fulﬁlls
a goal and this goal belongs to another actor, the last has to trust the ﬁrst one.
Pr7, Pr8 are used to verify whether the delegatee is not in the black list. Pr9 and
Pr10 state that an actor who delegates something to an other, has to trust him.
Rights or privileges can be given to trusted agents that are then accountable
for the agents to whom may further delegate this right to. So the agents should
only delegate to agents that they trust. This forms a delegation chain. If any
agent along this chain fails to meet the requirements associated with a delegated
right, the chain is broken and all agents following the failure are not permitted
to perform the action associated with the right. Thus, Pr11 is used to verify if
the delegate chain is valid.Pr1: oﬀers(A,S) ⇒? has(A,S)
Pr2: delegBL(ID,A,S,B,N,B) ⇒? has(A,S)
Pr3: fulﬁlls(A,S) ⇒? oﬀers(A,S)
Pr4: has(B,S) ∧ owns(A,S) ⇒? ∃N ∃B trustBL(A,S,B,N,B)
Pr5: oﬀers(B,S) ∧ owns(A,S) ⇒? ∃N ∃B trustBL(A,S,B,N,B)
Pr6: fulﬁlls(B,S) ∧ owns(A,S) ⇒? ∃N ∃B trustBL(A,S,B,N,B)
Pr7: delegBL(ID,A,S,B,N,B) ∧ owns(A,S) ⇒? ∀X ∈ B ¬has(X,S)
Pr8: delegBL(ID,A,S,B,N,B) ⇒? B / ∈ B
Pr9: delegBL(ID,A,S,B,N,B1) ⇒?
∃M ≥ N ∃B2 trustBL(A,S,B,M,B2)∧
B / ∈ B1 ∪ B2
Pr10: delegBLChain(A,S,B) ⇒? ∃N ∃B trustBL(A,S,B,N,B) ∧ B / ∈ B
Pr11: delegBLChain(A,S,B) ⇒?
∃M ∃A1 ...AM ∃N1 ...NM−1 ∃B1 ...BM−1
∀i ∈ [1...M−1] delegBL(IDi,Ai,S,Ai+1,Ni,Bi)∧
A1 = A ∧ AM = B ∧ Ni > Ni+1 ∧ Bi ⊆ Bi+1 ∧ Ai+1 / ∈ Bi
Table 4. Desirable Properties of a Design
has(A,S) :- owns(A,S).
has(B,S) :- delegate(ID,A,S,B,N).
fulfill(A,S) :- has(A,S), offer(A,S).
fulfilled(S) :- fulfill(A,S).
trustBL(A,S,B,N) :- #succ(N,M), trustBL(A,S,B,M), N>0.
trustBL(A,S,C,P) :- -bL(C), #succ(P,N), trustBL(A,S,B,N),
trustBL(B,S,C,M), M>=N, N>1.
trustBL(A,S,C,M) :- -bL(C), trustBL(A,S,B,N), trustBL(B,S,C,M), N>M, N>1.
Table 5. Axioms in Datalog
There are additional properties that we have not listed due to a lack of space,
such as checking delegation to actors that cannot have a service directly.
5 Implementation and Experimental Results
In order to illustrate our approach we formalize the case study and check-model it
in Datalog [1]. A datalog logic program is a set of rules of the form L:-L1∧...∧Ln
where L, called head, is a positive literal and L1,...,Ln are literals and they are
called body. Intuitively, if L1,...,Ln are true in the model then L must be true
in the model. The deﬁnition can be recursive, so deﬁned relations can also occur
in bodies of rules. Axioms of the form A ← B∧C can be represented as A:-B,C.
In Datalog properties can be represented as the constraint :-A, not B.
We use the DLV system [9] for the actual analysis. Consistency checks
are standard checks to guarantee that the security speciﬁcation is not self-
contradictory. Inconsistent speciﬁcations are due to unexpected interactions among
constraints in the speciﬁcations. The consistency checks are performed automat-
ically by DLV. The simplest consistency check veriﬁes whether there is any valid
scenario that respects all the constraints of the security speciﬁcation.:- offer(A,S), not has(A,S).
:- delegate(ID,A,S,B,N), not has(A,S).
:- offer(B,S), owns(A,S), not trustNP(A,S,B), A<>B.
:- fulfill(B,S), owns(A,S), not trustNP(A,S,B), A<>B.
:- delegateChain(A,S,C,N), not trustBL(A,S,C,N).
Table 6. Some properties in Datalog
trustFull(Pat,Rec,X) :- isHCA(X), owns(Pat,Rec).
trust(Pat,Rec,Cli,1) :- isClinicianOf(Cli,Pat), owns(Pat,Rec).
trustFull(hca,Rec,hospital) :- isRecord(Rec).
trustFull(hospital,Rec,mIS) :- isRecord(Rec).
trustFull(hospital,Rec,X) :- isClinician(X), isRecord(Rec).
Table 7. Health Care System-3 trust relationship in Datalog
Example 4. For model checking purposes we consider two patients, three clini-
cians, and one HCA. Patients trust completely the HCA for their personal in-
formation. Then we rapresent the relation between Patient and Clinician shown
in Figure 4, that is, the Patient trusts his clinicians with depth 1. Further, HCA
trusts completely Hospital for patients personal informations. Finally, we present
the relationship between Hospital and Clinician on patient personal information.
Below we introduce the constraint to verify whether only the clinicians of the
patient can have patient information.
:- trust(Pat,Rec,Cli,N), owns(Pat,Rec), isClinician(Cli),
not isClinicianOf(Cli,Pat).
The DLV system reports an inconsistency since all Clinicians are authorized
to have the personal information of any patient. Ideally we would authorize only
the clinician of the patient to have patient data.
Example 5. The trust relationship among actor in Figure 6 and in Figure 7 is
formalized in Table 7 and is described below:
1. Patient trusts completely HCA and he trusts directly his Clinician,
2. HCA trusts completely Hospital,
3. Hospital trusts completely Medical Information System, and
4. Medical Information System trusts completely Clinicians.
We can check whether only the clinicians of the patient can have patient
personal information according to Example 4. The DLV system report an incon-
sistency: in the current design every Clinician is implicitly authorized to have
patient personal information. To resolve this problem, we have to change the
trust model using the following trust relation between the Medical Information
System and the Clinician.trust(mIS,Rec,Cli,1) :- isClinicianOf(Cli,Pat),owns(Pat,Rec).
In other words, the Medical Information System allows an actor to access
directly the records of a patient if the actor is the physician of the patient.
We can now analyze the complete trust and functional model. In particular,
we check whether the delegater trusts the delegatee. The reﬁned result is that
patient’s consent must be sought for any other agent such as clinician’s colleagues
to be able to access at patient medical information, and the patient must be
notiﬁed of every access. So the clinician has to request a consulting to colleagues
through the hospital and the patient must give the permission to access the data.
It is also possible to make additional queries aimed at verifying a number of
security principles such as least-privilege, or need-to-know policies as done by
Liu et al. [20] in their security requirements model formalized in Alloy.
6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a formal model and a
methodology for analyzing trust during early requirement engineering. To this
end, we have proposed an enhancement of Tropos that is based on the clear
separation of functional dependencies, trust and delegation relationships. This
distinction makes it possible to capture organization-oriented security and trust
requirements without being caught into the technical details about how these
will be realized through digital certiﬁcates or access control mechanisms. The
modeling process we envision has the advantage of making clear why and where
trust management and delegation mechanisms are necessary, and which trust
relationships or requirements they address.
The framework we proposed supports the automatic veriﬁcation of security
requirements and trust relationships against functional dependencies speciﬁed
in a formal modeling language. The model can be easily modiﬁed to account for
degrees of trust. Levels of trust can be captured by using a qualitative theory
for goal analysis. See [14] for details.
Plans for future work include adding time to trust models and analyzing
these new features with the Formal Tropos T-Tool [11].
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